








Choosing that Climate Change is not a  
Tragedy of the Commons 
 






Climate change (CC) has become a paradigm case for externalities in 
general and for the Tragedy of the Commons (ToC) model by Hardin in 
particular. This is worrying as we have reasons to suspect that models 
like ToC are performative, such that they might become self-fulfilling 
prophecies. In this paper, we aim to enhance a strategy proposed by 
Matthew Kopec to cope with the self-fulfilling nature of ToC. First, we 
show how Kopec’s strategy about emphasising that ToC relies on 
strictly speaking false assumptions is unlikely to be a successful 
strategy. To construct a more promising strategy we argue that the 
argument of underdetermination implies that the employment of a 
specific model is an active choice that is guided by pragmatic criteria. 
Furthermore, picturing underdetermination in the case of CC as a form 
of Russian Roulette provides a rationale to choose between these 
underdetermined models. 
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1 FRAMING THE PROBLEM 
Climate Change is often modelled as a Tragedy of the Commons (ToC). Indeed, this has 
happened so many times that it seems to have evolved into a paradigm example for game 
theory and microeconomics – the ultimate tragedy of the commons: the prisoner’s 
dilemma (PD) of doom.1 Moreover, there is a high degree of confidence in modeling 
climate change this way which, for instance, lead the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) to ascribe “high confidence” (IPCC 2014, p. 211) to the 
correctness of that model.  
The implications of this model, however, are not just worrisome, they are 
frightening. For if it is correct to model climate change as a ToC, then there is little room 
left for optimism that our political means will be apt to tackle the challenge. This concern 
mainly arises because historic methods to dissolve the ToC appear to not apply to 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, (see Kopec, M. 2016, p. 6) which gives rise to a class 
of worries that we will condense as deterministic pessimism. Matthew Kopec, referring 
to this concern, was inclined to frame our current situation as “[…] the climate crisis that 
seems rationally forced upon us”, (Kopec, M. 2016, p. 15) and Hardin, the originator of 
the term ’Tragedy of the Commons’, accordingly framed the tragedy in terms of a lack 
of a “technical solution” (Hardin, G. 1968, p. 1248): meaning, that if we are sufficiently 
accurately portrayed by rational, utility-maximising agents assumed in the ToC model, 
we are faced with an unsolvable problem. This alone provides reason enough to review 
what assumptions are explicitly and implicitly stipulated in detail when we employ ToC 
to descriptively model our failure for sufficient mitigation. 
Worse perhaps, there is empirical evidence that some behavioural models are 
performative and therefore apt to become self-fulfilling prophecies. When used and 
implemented as a model in scientific or political discourse these models have a 
propensity to amplify and causally interfere with what they merely want to describe (see 
e.g. Mackenzie, D. 2006). The characteristics of performative models are roughly 
identified as (1) containing idealising assumptions that are strictly speaking false, (2) 
obtaining a high degree of scientific legitimacy and (3) being cognitively simple while 
having a significant explanatory depth (see Kopec, M. 2016, p. 9f.; And see Mackenzie, 
D. 2006, p. 43ff.). According to Kopec, the ToC model applied to climate change is 
 
1  For a proper disambiguation of the terms Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) and Tragedy of the 
Commons (ToC)  in the case of climate change see e.g. MacLean, D. (2015). In this paper, 
however, we will treat ToC as a variation of PD with incremental decisions by more than one 





highly likely to satisfy these characteristics and thus is likely to be a self-fulfilling 
prophecy.  
If this is true, asking the question of how confident we are about ToC is not only 
a purely positive-descriptive endeavour but one with severe and dangerous consequences 
of ethical dimension. Why, we ought to ask then, should we be confident that the ToC is 
the best way to model climate change negotiations? And if ToC turns out to be false, not 
applicable or just too vague to model our failure of mitigation, we will have even more 
urgent reasons to discard ToC as a misconception or oversimplified heuristic, before the 
misconception itself may aid to bring about the tragedy. 
In an attempt to maintain at least some optimism about humanity’s ability to 
alleviate the climate crisis as well as to avert the self-fulfilling performativity of the 
commons model, Kopec suggests some strategies we could employ when we 
communicate the climate crisis via that model. One of them is “[…] to insist that 
whenever the tragedy of the commons is presented as a way to model climate 
negotiations, we should insist that those presenting the model are clear how the 
assumptions of the model are not likely to be strictly speaking true” (Kopec, M. 2016, 
p. 12).  
While we agree with Kopec’s general point about the danger of ‘performativity’ 
or ‘self-fulfillingness’ in the case of ToC, we suggest that the solution strategy he 
proposes needs to be substantially improved. As we aim to show in section 2 by drawing 
on the philosophy of science literature, models in microeconomics tend to always be 
highly idealised – at best, they only represent a part of the world, perhaps a particular 
dynamic or process, and shed light on some conditional causal connections, i.e. if they 
succeed. As a result, talk of the strictly speaking falsity of ToC is trivial and thus unlikely 
to be helpful. 
However, by recognizing that models are always underdetermined by empirical 
evidence, we are provided with an alternative solution, that is to rely on a more pluralistic 
approach to modeling complex phenomena, as it is common in other complex sciences 
(like, e.g., ecology or weather forecasts). But because alternative and underdetermined 
models provide vastly different predictions and explanations, a pragmatic framework on 
how to choose between these models is needed, and, perhaps more importantly, some 
guidance on how to effectively communicate them to the public. One suggestion of a 
requirement of such a pragmatic framework on communication emerges from a 
particular reading of underdetermination, that we will spell out in a subsequent section: 




of behavioural theories renders us to be part of a kind of Russian Roulette that we shall 
dub Theory Roulette. 
2 ON STRICTLY SPEAKING FALSE ASSUMPTIONS 
On first sight, Kopec’s strategy appears reasonable. Since the ToC is a model, it 
necessarily must employ idealised assumptions specifically to enable it to say anything 
useful (see e.g. Weisberg, M. 2015). And clearly, we ought to point out the boundaries 
and limitations of our models when we employ them, and even more so when we are 
worried about potentially dangerous performativity of our model. Kopec’s strategy is 
also in line with a tradition of criticising economic models like ToC for being too simple, 
unrealistic and ignoring important features of the real world. In light of contemporary 
philosophy of science, however, Kopec’s strategy turns out to be rather hollow – for at 
least three reasons:  
Firstly, it is unhelpful to add the clarification that the ToC is strictly speaking 
false, for it suggests that there is something especially problematic not shared by other 
models. But as both scientists and philosophers have long argued, every assumption and 
every conclusion of every theory that we will ever come up with may very well be 
considered as not being likely to be true. Take, for example, the argument by the 
notorious pessimistic meta-induction, first formulated by Larry Laudan, L. (1981). If we 
take a retrospective on the history of scientific progress we are presented with an ongoing 
abandonment of formerly accepted theories and therefore should take seriously the idea 
that our current best theories will eventually suffer the same fate (see Laudan, L. 1981). 
Thus, the criterium of strictly speaking falsity can be considered to hold for almost any 
theory that we have. And still, yet, we rely on many of these strictly speaking false 
theories and models in many different ways. They are here to stay - and yet, despite 
being strictly speaking false, they are the best tools we have to understand reality. 
Because Kopec’s emphasis on falsity – as formulated above – would thereby apply to 
each and every theory of any kind, this strategy turns out to be a rather trivial non-starter. 
Also, consider the argument of underdetermination. According to the holistic 
account of that argument, the empirical data available at any time is insufficient to 
coercively decide between co-existing theories that are (1) compatible with a given set 
of observations and (2) mutually contradictory (see Stanford, K. 2017). Hence, the 
falsification of any theory leaves us with the open question of which remaining theory 
is the most reasonable. Willard Quine, originator and proponent of that account, thus 
concludes that “[…] the considerations which guide [someone] in warping his scientific 




p. 43; emphasis added). The argument of underdetermination contributes to the problem 
at hand in two ways. First, it provides an additional reason to consider (strictly speaking) 
falsity to be common among our theories, as we cannot coercively choose between 
multiple mutually exclusive models. Secondly, it provides a first glimpse on how to cope 
with that prevalence of falsehood and error in theories: a form of pragmatism. We will 
come back to this second point at the end of this paper. 
Finally, idealisation, and hence falsehood, is often considered an appreciated 
feature, not a bug of a model. Imagine, for example, standing in front of a subway map. 
With the explicit goal to travel from point A to point B, you require a map/model that 
helps you in doing exactly that and not a map that resembles the real world as close as 
possible. The common abstractions of subway maps render them less approximative to 
the real world than more detailed maps. Nevertheless, they provide us with relevant and 
useful insights for your specific task by not obscuring these insights with information 
that is inessential to you (Weisberg 2015). Models or theories that include all the 
variables would simply be unusable. Variants of arguments along this line of false 
models still being explanatory have been defended in the past, for example, by Uskali 
Mäki with his account of models as isolations (Mäki, U. 2009; For an overview of other 
arguments see Weisberg, M. 2015). 
For these three reasons (meta-induction, underdetermination and welcomed 
idealisation), only pointing out that ToC relies on strictly speaking false assumptions is 
unlikely to become a satisfactory strategy to convince people that ToC is, in fact, 
unhelpful and not shedding light on some relevant mechanism that leads to free riding. 
A proper strategy for alleviating a self-fulfilling climate change tragedy would have to 
be able to account for these three allowances of falsehood – and cannot rely on some 
imprecise emphasis on strictly speaking false assumptions. 
Instead of drawing on the notion of strict truth of falsity (which is largely 
abandoned among contemporary philosophers of science), we propose a strategy that 
seeks to fracture the seemingly ubiquitous and potentially dangerous confidence of 
climate change as a ToC in a more convincing manner. This strategy is composed of two 
parts.  
First, we will take the general problem of underdetermination literally for the 
case of climate change mitigation failure and roughly map out several potential attempts 
that likewise try to explain the situation we find ourselves in. Secondly, this 
underdetermination will prompt us with the need for pragmatic criteria to choose 
between these co-existing attempts of explanation. Here, we propose pragmatic 




Together, both parts form a strategy to alleviate a self-fulfilling tragedy that aims 
to go beyond a trivial emphasis on strictly speaking false assumptions. 
3 UNDER(DETER)MINING TOC 
How does underdetermination play out specifically for ToC when employed as a 
descriptive model for current and future mitigation failure? On its basis, we can derive 
from the argument of underdetermination that multiple different explanations for the 
currently observed lack of mitigation can exist. This does not say anything about the 
plausibility of these alternatives, but at least motivates to look out for them when being 
concerned about the unsolvability of climate change as a ToC. 
For example, a minimal extension to the standard representation of ToC is to 
add some form of prosocial preferences to the assumed agents. One might be justified to 
believe that these agents are now more realistic (i.e. they resemble real humans more 
closely) as prosocial preferences may be considered to be revealed by the factual 
presence of altruistic behaviour. When prosocial preferences are present, the difficulty 
of solving collective action problems, like climate change, is generally thought to be 
substantially reduced (See e.g.Ackermann, K./Murphy, R. 2019; Kline, R. et al. 2018; 
Tilman, A.R./Dixit, A.K./Levin, S.A. 2019). 
We are now prompted with two variants of ToC. Which one is climate change – 
ToC with or without prosocial preferences? This is underdetermination biting. 
An answer to this particular question, of course, does not have to rely on 
theoretical considerations on grounds of underdetermination only. Another approach 
would be to remark that both variations are simply too vague in both what their 
respective predictions really mean as well as what precise question they even attempt to 
resolve. This problem of vagueness, for instance, becomes apparent by the simple fact 
that advocates of climate change being a ToC are often unclear about whether the 
considered agents are supposed to resemble individuals, nations, nation leaders, or all of 
them at the same time (e.g. IPCC 2014, p. 211). A more mature behavioural theory, 
however, would presumably have to employ considerable contrasting between each of 
these alterations. 
Also, turning from underdetermination to vagueness like this manifests a 
supplementary step of this proposed strategy: Beyond suggesting variations and 
alternative explanations (that are likewise underdetermined when being tested against 
observed behaviour), it might pay off to attack ToC directly. That is to figure out where 
exactly the boundaries of the explanatory power of ToC lie and in which ways empirical 




pessimism and are self-fulfilling. We will refer to this as attempting a non-trivial 
falsification (as opposed to relying on strictly speaking false assumptions). This attempt 
may turn out in two different ways: 
First, if an attempt of non-trivial falsification succeeds, Kopec’s strategy would 
have to be bolstered up in that ToC for climate change is not only strictly speaking false, 
but also plainly speaking. ToC would have to be abandoned and one could hope for other 
models with more optimistic predictions. If they indeed are optimistic, then self-
fulfilling performativity could even be a welcome feature. In section 3.1, we will roughly 
sketch out various promising attempts that aim to achieve exactly that. 
Second, if falsification does not succeed, then ToC is still among the 
underdetermined candidates of a descriptive model for climate change mitigation failure. 
We will map out a selection of these alternative candidates in section 3.2. In this second 
case, recognising that we are in the midst of playing a Theory Roulette may provide 
pragmatic criteria on how to proceed when faced with said underdetermination. 
3.1 Attempting Non-Trivial Falsification 
Since we have already seen that strictly speaking falsity is not an adequate property of a 
model to be considered false such that it is not employed for an explanation, an attempt 
of non-trivial falsification is going to be a more intricate endeavour. It is intricate because 
the outcome of this attempt can no longer be a ‘simple’ binary answer, true or false. 
Instead, it will presumably have to be an answer of degree which, in turn, highly depends 
on aspects like what phenomenon exactly under which conditions is the subject of a 
particular ToC portrayal. 
As a starter, this would include disambiguating the earlier mentioned vagueness 
about who, precisely, the agents are supposed to be. Are our agents the representatives 
of nations, that failed to reach and enforce adequate agreements in Kyoto, Copenhagen 
and Paris? Or are they private households that seek to minimise their expenditure on 
power consumption? Or are they parents who rather use their air-conditioned car to drive 
their children to primary school because it seems more convenient and safe than to use 
a bicycle instead? In all these cases it has to be asked: Is ToC the best explanation we 
have? 
A striking case to disentangle this complexity of potential ToC instantiations has 
been made by Eleanor Ostrom, already over a decade ago (see Ostrom, E. 2009). It is, 
what she calls, a polycentric approach. Her critical review of ToC being used to model 
climate change mitigation failure is based on two grounds: the first is “[…] the existence 
of multiple externalities at small, medium, and large scales within the global externality 




vagueness about whom the agents are supposed to resemble, i.e. which scale we are 
looking at. Hence, according to Ostrom, it is not a good scientific approach to only look 
at one particular scale for costs and benefits of GHG mitigation, but instead at the 
multiplicity of effects of diverse actions on multiple scales and their reciprocating 
influence (Ostrom, E. 2009, p. 32ff.). It could be argued then, that by ignoring such 
multi-scale complexity, a critical degree of falsehood by idealisation is exceeded and 
ToC is indeed too simple to be explanatory – the same way a subway map that does not 
show you all the lines available exceeds a critical degree of idealisation for your specific 
purpose. 
The second ground of Ostrom’s criticism is the blatant lack of empirical 
evidence for the conventional ToC predictions. The unambiguous (and in the case of 
climate change, frightening) predictions are simply not supported by observation 
(Ostrom, E. 2009, p. 10). This insight cannot be overstated for a model of which the 
supposed paradigm case is the largest potential humanitarian crisis in history. Besides 
providing a book-length analysis of these empirical findings, Poteete, A.R./Ostrom, 
E./Janssen, M. (2010) call for an updated theory of collective action that accounts for 
diverse organising of commons at multiple levels. The upshot of this callout is “[…] that 
it encourages experimental efforts at multiple levels, as well as the development of 
methods for assessing the benefits and costs […] in one type of ecosystem and 
comparing these with results obtained in other ecosystems” (Ostrom, E. 2009, p. 39). 
Another approach is to question the assumption of whether climate change 
mitigation does even meet the criteria for being a common pool resource. Various 
concerns about this crucial assumption (that is often taken for granted) have been raised 
e.g. by Anthony Patt, A. (2017). One of them is that there indeed do exist potential 
technical solutions that yield medium-term costs of eliminating GHG emissions to be 
trivial, if not negative23FF(see Patt, A. 2017, p. 2). According to Patt, this insight is mainly 
driven by the field of evolutionary economics with the observation that, for example, 
“[…] policies to expand renewable energy also make them cheaper” (Patt, A. 2017, p. 
2). 
The third and last approach of non-trivially falsifying ToC we want to highlight 
is from Robert Northcott and Anna Alexandrova: straight-up refusing that a formal 
model like the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) can be causally explanatory. According to them, 
historic evidence of people behaving in PD-like patterns is traditionally used to claim 
that PD models are explanatory. However, they argue that the very same historic 




in these cases a historic explanation itself is much more insightful than a PD heuristic on 
top of that could ever be (see Northcott, R./Alexandrova, A. 2015). 
The same applies, one might argue, to climate change. A historic explanation for 
the situation we find ourselves in could include, for example, that over long periods of 
time, when the industrialisation of economies took off, humanity was not aware of its 
environmental impacts. And for the periods of when science began to grasp the 
dimensions of human impact on the climate, it might be more explanatory to analyse 
behaviour in terms of inertia of scientific insights to be translated in political action. 
Besides being potentially more explanatory, this leaves open many doors for not being 
trapped in some form of deterministic pessimism stemming from overconfidence in one 
specific model. 
Thinking of other historic causal explanations like these leads us to the next part 
of this strategy: coming up with alternative explanation attempts, irrespective of whether 
non-trivial falsification attempts like above can or will succeed. 
3.2 Mapping-Out Alternative Explanation Attempts 
3.2.1 Prisoner’s Dilemma Is Not The Only Game In Town 
By far, ToC – and as a more general form: the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) – is not the only 
available game-theoretic approach that aims to model the apparent climate negotiations 
we are faced with (see e.g.Wood, P.J. 2011). Moreover, just like ToC extended with 
prosocial preferences, not all of them yield the same daunting predictions, while 
nevertheless employing potentially more sensible assumptions. Selected examples 
would be the following: 
Rather than a single shot PD, it could be more accurate to portray climate change 
negotiations as an iterated PD, as people (or countries etc.) make and change decisions 
about their emissions over time (see Wood, P.J. 2011, p. 17f.). In models like this, many 
more nash equilibria are possible, besides the tragedy. Also, allowing for behaviour like 
moral punishment in one’s models allows for predictions of cooperation (see Boyd, 
R./Richerson, P.J. 1992). 
Hence, including decision-making over time as well as moral punishment are 
alternations in ToC model design that have major effects on its predictions. That does 
not necessarily make them better fitting theories (e.g. they still work with a similar 
degree of idealisation) but at least they show that ToC is not the only game in town. If 
one were still to commit to ToC in an undogmatic manner one would need to put forward 
damning reasons of why ToC is still the obvious choice, i.e. to show that moral 





3.2.2 Decoupling Wellbeing and GHG Emissions 
Although arguments of this kind have often been subject to much scrutiny it still is 
unclear whether future societal wellbeing can be decoupled from GHG emissions. 
Possible answers to that question also heavily depend on the employed proxy for societal 
wellbeing (e.g. gross domestic product does in many cases not appear adequate) (see 
Ward, J.D. et al. 2016). 
What we can say with certainty, however, is that at least several economical and 
technological advancements offer help to transition to decoupled wellbeing: already 
today investors (households and businesses alike) have immediate monetary incentives 
to invest in low-GHG-emitting activities.  
For example, the levelised cost of electricity (LCOE) for new renewable energy 
source power plants in many cases has already sunk beneath the LCOE of new fossil 
fuel plants (Capros, P. et al. 2016). Also, for example, the total cost of ownership of 
battery electric vehicles is lower than that of its combustion-engined predecessors (see 
Hagman, J. et al. 2016). 
Whether GHG-savings on products and services like these subsequently lead to 
a net reduction of emissions, however, is an even more controversial debate, as a 
decrease in cost (or increase in monetary incentives) may easily foster overall 
consumption and hence backfire. However, focusing on the very existence of positive 
incentives to mitigate GHG emissions prompts further thoughts about us actually having 
a preference for agreement. 
3.2.3 Preference for Agreement 
Framing climate change as a ToC implies that it is individually rational to emit GHG. 
On the other hand, it could also be argued that there is, in fact, a stark rational incentive 
to reach an agreement to limit emissions. After all, collective ecological precaution is 
utility maximising, as allowing for damage through climate change constitutes a 
collective decrease in welfare. Traditional explanations in the ToC framework for why 
this does not lead to a significant reduction of emissions often have to do with time 
preferences of people, according to which future payoffs are heavily discounted (e.g. 
Weitzman, M.L. 2007), which is what makes short-sighted behaviour in PD-like patterns 
possible in the first place. 
Because of the very notion of GHG mitigation being utility maximising, 
however, we see people like Larry Fink, head of the world’s largest asset manager 
BlackRock, forecasting that “[climate change is] driving a profound reassessment of risk 




changes in capital allocation more quickly than we see changes to the climate itself” 
(Fink, L. 2020). 
This constitutes a significant shift in what one might think to be the payoff 
structure of a climate change mitigation game. From this point of view, you do not have 
to be a climate activist that supports costly, “irrational”, economy-burdening policies to 
support climate change mitigation. Arguing from the viewpoint of an investor that seeks 
to minimise risks for her investments suffices as “climate risk is investment risk” (Fink, 
L. 2020). Furthermore, it appears to be this very line of arguing that is mostly employed 
by environmentalists, economists and politicians alike when promoting the case of 
environmental protection in public discourse, furthermore suggesting that this preference 
is truly present. Climate change mitigation, as such, can be considered perfectly 
consistent with utility maximisation – just this time a new important variable is added to 
the utility function assumed: the stability of climate. 
Outlining climate change like this has some important implications: First, it 
motivates the consideration that we genuinely possess the preference to reach an 
agreement over failing to do so. If this is true, then the game we are in has changed. 
Instead of a prisoner’s dilemma, climate change negotiations might be better described 
by a game-theoretic model like Battle of the Sexes (BoS) (see MacLean, D. 2015, p. 
226). 
Secondly, recognising that we are in a different kind of game such as BoS as 
well as acknowledging that climate action is consistent with individual utility 
maximisation, renders lacking mitigation not as a result of rational behaviour (which is 
an expression quite positively connotated which does not help to solve dangerous 
performativity) but as blatantly irrational instead. Irrationality, here, would denote the 
inability to live up to one’s real preferences – in this case: to reach an agreement. Thus, 
in the next section, consider a sketched-out alternative explanation of climate change 
mitigation failure that explicitly frames the current mitigation failure as irrational: the 
availability bias. 
 
3.2.4 Behavioural Sciences to the Rescue 
If we accept that non-mitigation exemplifies irrational rather than rational behaviour, a 
descriptive model for a causal explanation of current mitigation failure would have to 
aim to answer why and how this irrational behaviour came about. An answer to this 




insights from psychology, sociology as well as political and historical science – or from 
the behavioural sciences, in general.2 
One such potential explanation, for example, we find in the availability bias, 
coined by Tversky, A./Kahneman, D. (1973). A fitting example of this might be the 
recent COVID-19 pandemic. In a matter of weeks after the virus breakout, almost all 
nations closed borders and public life came to a complete halt.  Thus, apparently, if the 
danger and risk are sufficiently experienced, felt and perceived, drastic global political 
action and cooperation is possible.  
The potential aggregate damage brought upon us by climate change, however, 
is arguably significantly higher than the danger posed by one single pandemic. Here we 
clearly underreact – so what is the difference? Drawing on the availability bias might 
insofar pave the road for a causal psychological explanation as the damages through 
climate change are a delayed and global phenomenon whereas COVID-19 is a more 
immediate threat. Hence, the pandemic is more available for subjective judgement of 
danger. Consequently, political action is more drastic for the less dangerous threat, 
which, if formulated like that, seems irrational. 
There has been research along a similar line of thought long before COVID-19, 
known under the name value-action-gap which denotes a mismatch between valuing a 
stable climate on the one hand and inaction to sustain it on the other hand (see e.g. 
Kollmuss, A./Agyeman, J. 2002).  
4 THEORY ROULETTE 
Even though ToC is often considered an obvious no-brainer when it comes to climate 
change, we have seen that it is by far not the only explanation one might think of – some 
of which we have mapped out in the previous section. We also hinted at how this set of 
non-trivially unfalsified explanations can be considered underdetermined. Therefore, as 
long as it is not clear which of these is the most reasonable descriptive approach, we are 
left with an active choice about which explanatory frame to use when communicating 
the challenges ahead. This choice, as Quine suggested, is necessarily a pragmatic one. 
Additionally, and as Kopec pointed out, the explanation we choose can be 
expected to be performative. This conjunction of underdetermination and self-fulfilling 
performativity sets the stakes high for this particular choice among explanations. We 
aim to show that as long as we cannot coercively rule out the most pessimistic model, 
we are good advised to lay emphasis on the more optimistic ones, both in research and 
 
2 Note that this approach also corresponds with the argument by Alexandrova and Northcott 




in communication. That is because if self-fulfilling performativity and 
underdetermination hold, we are currently in the midst of playing a form of Russian 
Roulette – just not with a cartridge, but with theories, one of which being deadly. 
Spinning the cylinder of the revolver is appreciating and recognising 
underdetermination. Pulling the trigger is the spreading of the word and watching 
performativity happen. The pivotal difference of this analogy to our exposure to 
underdetermination and performativity is that we can actively choose not to load our 
revolver with a deadly cartridge.  
 Instead of talking about a tragedy that allegedly is inevitable if everybody acted 
“rationally” or, even worse, about the tragedy being a “rational necessity”, which would 
only take in insights from one single underdetermined candidate, a recognition of 
underdetermination gives us the opportunity to flip the table. As a starter, this could be 
explicitly framing mitigation as being the rational and utility maximising thing to do. 
That includes pointing out forms of ignorance about the dangers and utility damages of 
climate change, of which we have an insurmountable amount of scientific evidence, as 
an irrational cognitive bias.  
 Indeed, we may also want to make use of the performative nature of models, 
even if the assumed underlying subjective payoff structure would not dramatically 
change after such a switch of framing. We already have empirical evidence that, for 
instance, naming a situation differently without changing the payoff structure has effects 
on behaviour: in the infamous paper “The Name of the Game” Liberman et al. (2004) 
conduct the same experiment twice just giving it two different names, Wall Street Game 
and Community Game. Even though it was the same Prisoner’s Dilemma on paper the 
test subjects cooperated much more in the latter one  (Liberman, V./Samuels, S.M./Ross, 
L. 2004).  What would happen, then, if the name of the game of climate change was not 
ToC, but something that does not necessitate the largest collective action failure in 
human history? 
And lastly, this notion of us being prompted with an active choice to (not) let 
Theory Roulette perpetrate can be further condensed in form of a decision matrix: If 
underdetermination forces us to make a pragmatic choice, then emphasising non-ToC 







Figure 1. [Theory Roulette as a decision matrix]. 
 
5 RESPONDING TO POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS 
5.1 Normative Function 
The first potential objection we want to address is to say that models like ToC often 
serve a normative function, not a purely descriptive one, as in “we ought to collaborate”. 
Hence, it is often used precisely to show why agreeing on coordinative action is rational.  
It is also this very notion that seems to be at play in the earlier mentioned IPCC executive 
summary (see IPCC 2014, p. 211ff). We see two flaws in this remark. 
The first has been pointed out by Northcott and Alexandrova in regards to the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD). That is, such normative advice can only be good if climate 
change is indeed accurately described by a PD. Otherwise, people would behave 
differently than predicted in the model anyway and the advice would miss its target. 
“Thus a normative perspective offers no escape from the central problem, namely the 
ubiquitous significance in practice of richer contextual factors unmodeled by the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma” (Northcott, R./Alexandrova, A. 2015, p. 84). Considering that ToC 
is merely a special version of the PD, the same holds for ToC. 
Secondly, to express that we ought to collaborate is to express that one does 
value achieving cooperation over failing to do so. So, in any situation where this very 
preference is expressed, the Battle of the Sexes (BoS) approach mentioned earlier does 
capture these preferences. Subsequent failure to act according to these preferences can 
then be explained not in the realms of BoS, but rather in terms of irrational cognitive 
biases like the availability bias or the value-action-gap. 
5.2 This Is Wishful Thinking 
One might argue that such a callout on emphasis, which is a normative claim about which 




hence bad scientific practice – because one deliberately chooses another model, simply 
depending on whether one does like its implications and not on any epistemic grounds 
such as non-trivial falsification.  
This objection, however, falls short in multiple ways. First, because if ToC is 
underdetermined, we are prompted with a pragmatic choice of some sort anyway – which 
is a pure epistemic and not a normative “wishful” argument, albeit more subtle than a 
direct non-trivial falsification of ToC would be. Being confronted with performativity, 
to be precautionary and hence potentially prevent damage is a reasonable criterium to be 
incorporated in this pragmatic decision. 
Secondly, if ToC is truly self-fulfilling, which is why we need this emphasis in 
the first place, then ToC already has obvious major flaws as a descriptive model which 
we consider reason enough to justify looking at and emphasising both these flaws as well 
as alternative or more refined explanations.  
Thirdly, contemporary philosophy of science seems to settle on the idea of at 
least some form of model pluralism (see Veit, W. 2020; 2021). That is to say that each 
phenomenon has multiple different aspects that require multiple different models for 
explanations. So, without even waiting for ex-post (in)validation, we can ex-ante assume 
that a single model like ToC will not suffice as a descriptive behavioural model after all. 
We can expect that at least multiple models for multiple aspects are needed simply in 
virtue of our epistemic uncertainty. Underdetermination requires pluralism both in 
method and models. 
Considering its status as the one and only paradigm model of climate change 
mitigation failure, despite there being lots of substantial criticism (e.g. mentioned earlier: 
lack of evidence, historic explanations), we have here criticized the disproportionate 
focus of scientific effort and communication in that one direction – which seems rather 
unhealthy when looking at the more optimistic and potentially even more explanatory 
alternatives that we could have spent more time on. Thus, being pushed to explore other 
directions of explanations is likely to be beneficiary anyway in this case – regardless of 
whether this push stems from a deliberate emphasis based on normative grounds or from 
some other pragmatic criterium which we will necessarily employ anyway. 
6 CONCLUSION 
Starting with worries of deterministic pessimism and performativity regarding climate 
change being a ToC, we highlighted a strategy by Kopec that aims to deal with these 




assumptions is trivial and thus unlikely to be convincing. What is needed, is a strategy 
that allows for the generally accepted margins of falsehoods in scientific practice. 
Enter underdetermination of scientific theory: for our case, it provides a rationale 
that justifies employing and looking out for alternative explanations. Additionally, the 
existence of strong non-trivial falsification attempts gives further reason to abandon ToC 
as a descriptive model for climate change mitigation.  
Lastly, we pictured the conjunction of underdetermination and performativity as 
a Russian Roulette which aims to provide pragmatic normative criteria to choose 
between models when faced with underdetermination as in our case.  
As such, we see several advantages to Kopec’s suggestions in the strategy 
proposed here. First, it bypasses an impractical and trivial emphasis on strictly speaking 
false assumptions.  
Secondly, by putting ToC in the broader context of underdetermination it shows 
that employing a particular model is an active choice. This is also the reason why this 
proposed strategy goes beyond the other two additional strategies that Kopec 
additionally put forward but which we did not mention explicitly yet: pointing out that 
other more optimistic explanation attempts exist (see Kopec, M. 2016, p. 13ff.). 
Thirdly, it provides both a catchphrase to communicate that we are necessitated 
to make that choice, as well as a rationale for making that decision. Depending on how 
convincing one does find the attempts of non-trivial falsification, this choice is quite an 
easy one, even on purely epistemic grounds. Because although it has proven to be a 
handy and important tool in many areas, game theory has boundaries. This is against the 
“guiding prejudices of contemporary game theory”, as game theorist Herbert Gintis puts 
it, of game theory being “sufficient to explain all of human social existence” (Gintis, H. 
2009, p. xiii). Even though ToC provides a neat story to portray a possible mechanism 
of freeriding and mutual exploitation, it does not say a word about the specifics. When 
applied to concrete real-world examples, like climate change, the explanatory depth of 
ToC appears shallow, as argued by Northcott, R./Alexandrova, A. (2015). 
 Furthermore, framing mitigation failure not as a necessity of rationality but as 
an irrational cognitive bias instead does not only shed light on other potential behavioural 
mechanics that might likewise be at play but also helps to communicate the immediate 
benefits of climate change mitigation. There has already been research on how a 
“nudging” of that sort might proceed (see Andor, M./Fels, K.M. 2018). 
Although climate change has become the alleged obvious paradigm case of ToC 
that is mentioned in executive summaries and introductory courses to economics alike, 




Roulette, ToC should arguably rather be the paradigm case of how game-theoretic 
models are overrated and employed for invalid inferences about the real world. If it is 
true that, as Nicholas Stern puts it, climate change (emissions being a public good and 
climate change thus a ToC) constitutes “[…] the greatest market failure the world has 
ever seen” (Stern, N. 2007, viii) then it exemplifies the greatest challenge for the 
behavioural sciences to fathom why and how humanity stands in its own way to alleviate 
a dire existential catastrophe. Game-theoretic heuristics, as it stands, can only be a part 
of that puzzle that should not be overstated.  
After all, if we take performativity serious we better should win this match of 
Theory Roulette – it is on us to improve our chances by choosing other existing 
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